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Torture and Plea Bargaining*
John H. Langbein'
In this essay I shall address the modem American system of
plea bargaining from a perspective that must appear bizarre, al-
though I hope to persuade you that it is illuminating. I am going to
contrast plea bargaining with the medieval European law of torture.
My thesis is that there are remarkable parallels in origin, in func-
tion, and even in specific points of doctrine, between the law of
torture and the law of plea bargaining. I shall suggest that these
parallels expose someaimportant truths about how criminal justice
systems respond when their trial procedures fall into deep disorder.
I. THE LAW OF TORTURE'
For about half a millennium, from the middle of the thirteenth
century to the middle of the eighteenth, a system of judicial torture
lay at the heart of Continental criminal procedure. In our own day
the very word "torture" is, gladly enough, a debased term. It has
come to mean anything unpleasant, and we hear people speak of a
tortured interpretation of a poem, or the torture of a dull dinner
party. In discussions of contemporary criminal procedure we hear
the word applied to describe illegal police practices or crowded
prison conditions. But torture as the medieval European lawyers
understood it had nothing to do with official misconduct or with
criminal sanctions. Rather, the application of torture was a routine
and judicially supervised feature of European criminal procedure.
Under certain circumstances the law permitted the criminal courts
to employ physical coercion against suspected criminals in order to
induce them to confess. The law went to great lengths to limit this
technique of extorting confessions to cases in which it was thought
that the accused was highly likely to be guilty, and to surround the
use of torture with other safeguards that I shall discuss shortly.
This astonishing body of law grew up on the Continent as an
adjunct to the law of proof-what we would call the system of
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trial-in cases of serious crime (for which the sanction was either
death or severe physical maiming2). The medieval law of proof was
designed in the thirteenth century to replace an earlier system of
proof, the ordeals, which the Roman Church effectively destroyed
in the year 1215. 3 The ordeals purported to achieve absolute cer-
tainty in criminal adjudication through the happy expedient of hav-
ing the judgments rendered by God, who could not err. The replace-
ment system of the thirteenth century aspired to achieve the same
level of safeguard-absolute certainty-for human adjudication.
Although human judges were to replace God in the judgment
seat, they would be governed by a law of proof so objective that it
would make that dramatic substitution unobjectionable-a law of
proof that would eliminate human discretion from the determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. Accordingly, the Italian Glossators who
designed the system developed and entrenched the rule that convic-
tion had to be based upon the testimony of two unimpeachable
eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the crime-evidence that was, in
the famous phrase, "clear as the noonday sun." Without these two
eyewitnesses, a criminal court could not convict an accused who
contested the charges against him. Only if the accused voluntarily
confessed the offense could the court convict him without the eye-
witness testimony.
Another way to appreciate the purpose of these rules is to un-
derstand their corollary: conviction could not be based upon cir-
cumstantial evidence, because circumstantial evidence depends for
its efficacy upon the subjective persuasion of the trier who decides
whether to draw the inference of guilt from the evidence of circum-
stance. Thus, for example, it would not have mattered in this sys-
tem that the suspect was seen running away from the murdered
man's house and that the bloody dagger and the stolen loot were
found in his possession. Since no eyewitness saw him actually
plunge the weapon into the victim, the court could not convict him
of the crime.
In the history of Western culture no legal system has ever made
a more valiant effort to perfect its safeguards and thereby to exclude
completely the possibility of mistaken conviction. But the Europe-
ans learned in due course the inevitable lesson. They had set the
level of safeguard too high. They had constructed a system of proof
2 The use of imprisonment as a sanction for serious crime was a development of the
Renaissance and later times. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Sanction of Imprison-
ment for Serious Crime, 5 J. LEGAL STm. 35 (1976), substantially reproduced in J. LANGBMN,
supra note 1, at 27-44, 151-64.
3J. LANGBEIN, supra note 1, at 5-7.
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that could as a practical matter be effective only in cases involving
overt crime or repentant criminals. Because society cannot long
tolerate a legal system that lacks the capacity to convict unrepen-
tant persons who commit clandestine crimes, something had to be
done to extend the system to those cases. The two-eyewitness rule
was hard to compromise or evade, but the confession rule seemed
to invite the "subterfuge" 4 that in fact resulted. To go from accept-
ing a voluntary confession to coercing a confession from someone
against whom there was already strong suspicion was a step that
began increasingly to be taken. The law of torture grew up to regu-
late this process of generating confessions.
The spirit of safeguard that had inspired the unworkable formal
law of proof also permeated the subterfuge. The largest chapter of
the European law of torture concerned the prerequisites for exami-
nation under torture. The European jurists devised what Anglo-
American lawyers would today call a rule of probable cause, de-
signed to assure that only persons highly likely to be guilty would
be examined under torture. Thus, torture was permitted only when
a so-called "half proof" had been established against the suspect.
That meant either one eyewitness, or circumstantial evidence of
sufficient gravity, according to a fairly elaborate tariff.5 In the exam-
ple where a suspect was caught with the dagger and the loot, each
of those indicia would be a quarter proof. Together they cumulated
to a half proof, which was sufficient to permit the authorities to
dispatch the suspect for a session in the local torture chamber.
In this way the prohibition against using circumstantial evi-
dence was overcome. The law of torture found a place for circum-
stantial evidence, but a nominally subsidiary place. Circumstantial
evidence was not consulted directly on the ultimate question, guilt
or innocence, but on a question of interlocutory procedure-whether
or not to examine the accused under torture. Even there the law
attempted to limit judicial discretion by promulgating predeter-
mined, ostensibly objective criteria for evaluating the indicia and
assigning them numerical values (quarter proofs, half proofs, and
the like). Vast legal treatises were compiled on this jurisprudence
of torture to guide the examining magistrate in determining whether
there was probable cause for torture.'
'Maitland's famous term, 2 F. POLLOCK & F.W. MArrLAND, THE HIsToRY OF ENGLISH LAW
660 (2d ed. 1898).
J. LANGBEI, supra note 1, at 14.
'These works are canvassed in 1 & 2 P. FioRLu, LA TORTURA GUD-IAUA NEL Dirrro
COMUNE (1953-54).
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CAPVT XXXVIII.
De repetitione quftlionis, flue tor-
turx.
This woodcut from a leading sixteenth-century European criminal
procedure manual shows the accused being examined under torture
in the presence of the court, clerk, and court functionaries. The illus-
tration, from Joost Damhouder's Praxis Rerum Criminalium 91 (Ant-
werp ed. 1562), appears in chapter 38, which discusses the rules for
repeating the infliction of torture on an accused who has previously
resisted confession despite examination under torture. (Reproduced
with permission from the rare book collection of The University of
Chicago Law Library.)
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In order to achieve a verbal or technical reconciliation with the
requirement of the formal law of proof that the confession be volun-
tary, the medieval lawyers treated a confession extracted under tor-
ture as involuntary, hence ineffective, unless the accused repeated
it free from torture at a hearing that was held a day or so later. Often
enough the accused who had confessed under torture did recant
when asked to confirm his confession. But seldom to avail: the ex-
amination under torture could thereupon be repeated. An accused
who confessed under torture, recanted, and then found himself tor-
tured anew, learned quickly enough that only a "voluntary" confes-
sion at the ratification hearing would save him from further agony
in the torture chamber.7
Fortunately, more substantial safeguards were devised to gov-
ern the actual application of torture. These were rules designed to
enhance the reliability of the resulting confession. Torture was not
supposed to be used to elicit an abject, unsubstantiated confession
of guilt. Rather, torture was supposed to be employed in such a way
that the accused would disclose the factual detail of the
crime-information which, in the words of a celebrated German
statute, "no innocent person can know."' The examining magistrate
was forbidden to engage in so-called suggestive questioning, in
which the examiner supplied the accused with the detail he wanted
to hear from him. Moreover, the information admitted under torture
was supposed to be investigated and verified to the extent feasible.
If the accused confessed to the slaying, he was supposed to be asked
where he put the dagger. If he said he buried it under the old oak
tree, the magistrate was supposed to send someone to dig it up.
Alas, these safeguards never proved adequate to overcome the
basic flaw in the system. Because torture tests the capacity of the
accused to endure pain rather than his veracity, the innocent might
(as one sixteenth-century commentator put it) yield to "the pain
and torment and confess things that they never did."9 If the examin-
ing magistrate engaged in suggestive questioning, even accidentally,
his lapse could not always be detected or prevented. If the accused
knew something about the crime, but was still innocent of it, what
he did know might be enough to give his confession verisimilitude.
7 J. LANGBEIN, supra note 1, at 15-16. An accused who resisted any confession under
torture was supposed to be set free (subject to rules permitting further torture if new evidence
was thereafter discovered); it was said that the accused had "purged" the incriminating
evidence when he endured the torture without confession. Id. at 16.
1 Constitutio Criminalis Carolina art. 54 (1532), translated in J. LANGBEN, PROSFCtriNG
CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE: ENGLAND, GERMANY, FRANCE 282 (1974).
' J. DAMHOUDER, PRACTIQUE JUDICAIRE ES CAUSES CRIMINELLs ch. 39, at 44 (Antwerp
ed. 1564) (first edition published as PRAxis RERUM CRIMIAIu1m (Louvain 1554)).
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In some jurisdictions the requirement of verification was not en-
forced, or was enforced indifferently.
These shortcomings in the law of torture were identified even
in the Middle Ages and were the subject of emphatic complaint in
Renaissance and early modem times. In the eighteenth century, as
the law of torture was finally about to be abolished along with the
system of proof that had required it, Beccaria and Voltaire became
famous as critics of judicial torture, but they were latecomers to a
critical legal literature nearly as old as the law of torture itself.
Judicial torture survived the centuries not because its defects had
been concealed, but in spite of their having been long revealed. The
two-eyewitness rule had left European criminal procedure without
a tolerable alternative. Having entrenched this unattainable level
of safeguard in their formal trial procedure, the Europeans found
themselves obliged to evade it through a subterfuge that they knew
was defective. The coerced confession had to replace proof of guilt.
II. THE LAW OF PLEA BARGAINING
I am now going to cross the centuries and cross the Atlantic in
order to speak of the rise of plea bargaining in twentieth-century
America.
The description of the European law of torture that I have just
presented has been meant to stir among American readers an un-
pleasant sensation of the familiar. The parallels between the mod-
em American plea bargaining system and the ancient system of
judicial torture are many and chilling. I have lived with them for
some years now, and the least that I hope to achieve in this essay is
to unburden myself somewhat by sharing the disturbing vision that
I think would come to any American who had spent time studying
the European law of torture.
By way of preface, let me set forth briefly some of the rudiments
of our plea bargaining system. Plea bargaining occurs when the
prosecutor induces a criminal accused to confess guilt and to waive
his right to trial in exchange for a more lenient criminal sanction
than would be imposed if the accused were adjudicated guilty fol-
lowing trial. The prosecutor offers leniency either directly, in the
form of a charge reduction, or indirectly, through the connivance of
the judge, in the form of a recommendation for reduced sentence
that the judge will follow. In exchange for procuring this leniency
for the accused, the prosecutor is relieved of the need to prove the
accused's guilt, and the court is spared having to adjudicate it. The
court condemns the accused on the basis of his confession, without
independent adjudication.
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Plea bargaining is, therefore, a nontrial procedure for convict-
ing and condemning people accused of serious crime. If you turn to
the American Constitution in search of authority for plea bargain-
ing, you will look in vain. Instead, you will find-in no less hallowed
a place than the Bill of Rights-an opposite guarantee, a guarantee
of trial. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . trial . ..by an
impartial jury. . .. "I'
In our day, jury trial continues to occupy its central place both
in the formal law and in the mythology of the law. The constitutions
have not changed, the courts pretend to enforce the defendant's
right to jury trial, and the television transmits a steady flow of
dramas in which a courtroom contest for the verdict of the jury leads
inexorably to the disclosure of the true culprit. In truth, criminal
jury trial has largely disappeared in America. The criminal justice
system now disposes of virtually all cases of serious crime through
plea bargaining. Depending on the jurisdiction, as many as 99 per-
cent of all felony convictions are by plea." This nontrial procedure
has become the ordinary dispositive procedure of American law.
Why? Why has our formal system of proof and trial been set out
of force? What has happened in the interval of less than two centu-
ries between the constitutionalization of jury trial in 1791 and the
present day to substitute this nontrial system for the trial procedure
envisaged by the Framers? Scholars are only beginning to investi-
gate the history of plea bargaining, 2 but enough is known to permit
us to speak with some confidence about the broad outline. In the
two centuries from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth, a vast
transformation overcame the Anglo-American1 3 institution of crimi-
nal jury trial, rendering it absolutely unworkable as an ordinary
dispositive procedure and requiring the development of an alterna-
' U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
" The figure of 99 percent is given for Detroit in J. BOND, PLEA BRAINING AND GuruTY
PLEAS 13 (1975). Professor Alschuler reports 95 percent for Houston in 1975. Alschuler, The
Trial Judge's Role in Plea Bargaining (pt. I), 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1059, 1063 n.20 (1976). In
New York in 1971, 97 percent of felony convictions were by plea. See VERA INSTrUTE OF
JUSTICE, FELONY ARRESTs: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN Naw YORK CITY'S COURTS 7
(1977). In a large statistical study of New York City felony data about to be published, Hans
Zeisel computes that 98 percent of convictions were obtained by plea. H. ZESEL, THE ANAT-
omy or LAw ENFORCEMENT chs. 4, 12, 28 (1979) (forthcoming).
11 See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and its History, 13 LAw & Soc'y RaV. (1979) (forthcom-
ing); Friedman, Plea Bargaining in Historical Perspective, id. (forthcoming); Langbein,
Understanding the Short History of Plea Bargaining, id. (forthcoming).
11 On the extent of plea bargaining in England, see Baldwin & McConville, Sentencing
Problems Raised by Guilty Pleas: An Analysis of Negotiated Pleas in the Birmingham Crown
Court, 41 MOD. L. REv. 544, 545 n.3 (1978).
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tive procedure, which we now recognize to be the plea bargaining
system.
In eighteenth-century England jury trial was still a summary
proceeding.14 In the Old Bailey in the 1730s we know that the court
routinely processed between twelve and twenty jury trials for felony
in a single day. A single jury would be impaneled and would hear
evidence in numerous unrelated cases before retiring to formulate
verdicts in all. Lawyers were not employed in the conduct of ordi-
nary criminal trials, either for the prosecution or the defense. The
trial judge called the witnesses (whom the local justice of the peace
had bound over to appear), and the proceeding transpired as a rela-
tively unstructured "altercation" between the witnesses and the
accused.1 5 In the 1790s, when the Americans were constitution-
alizing English jury trial, it was still rapid and efficient. "The trial
of Hardy for high treason in 1794 was the first that ever lasted more
than one day, and the court seriously considered whether it had any
power to adjourn. . ... -, By contrast, we may note that the trial
of Patricia Hearst for bank robbery in 1976 lasted forty days17 and
that the average felony jury trial in Los Angeles in 1968 required 7.2
days of trial time." In the eighteenth century the most characteris-
tic (and time-consuming) features of modern jury trial, namely ad-
versary procedure and the exclusionary rules of the law of criminal
evidence, were still primitive and uncharacteristic. The accused's
right to representation by retained counsel was not generalized to
all felonies until the end of the eighteenth century in America and
the nineteenth century in England.'9 Appellate review was very re-
11 See generally Langbein, The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv.
263 (1978).
"1 See id. at 272-84. The word "altercation" is the famous term of Sir Thomas Smith. T.
SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 80 (London 1583).
1, MacKinnon, The Law and the Lawyers, in 2 JOHNSON'S ENGLAND 287, 307 (A.S. Tur-
berville ed. 1933) (referring to Rex v. Hardy, 24 St. Tr. 199 (1794)).
', [1976] ADmNsTATIv OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS ANN. REP. 335.
1S The figure for Los Angeles appears in SAN FRANCISCO COMMrrTEE ON CRIME, A REPORT
ON THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF SAN FRANCISCO, PART I: THE SUPERIOR COURT BACK-
LOG-CONSEQUENCES AND REMEDIES 1 (1970). (I am grateful to Professor Albert W. Alschuler
for the reference.) Of course, this figure must reflect the diversion of most easy cases into non-
jury-trial channels such as plea bargaining, bench trial, and conditional nonprosecution.
Reliable figures for New Jersey criminal trials conducted in 1976-77 (bench and jury) are less
spectacular, although they hardly detract from the contrast with eighteenth-century trial
duration figures. Only five percent of the trials lasted more than five days, whereas 49 percent
lasted from one to three days, 35 percent less than a day, and 11 percent from three to five
days. ADMINIsTRATivE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS, STATE OF NEw JERSEY, ANN. REP. 1976-1977,
at F-2 (1978). (I owe this reference to'Professor Jerome Israel.)
" U.S. CONST. amend. VI (1791); 6 & 7 Will. IV, ch. 114 (1836). For the American
colonies, see the valuable compilation in the appendix to Note, An Historical Argument for
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stricted into the twentieth century; counsel for indigent accused was
not required until the middle of this century. The practices that so
protract modem American jury trial-extended voir dire, exclusion-
ary rules and other evidentiary barriers, motions designed to pro-
voke and preserve issues for appeal, maneuvers and speeches of
counsel-all are late growths in the long history of common law
criminal procedure. 21
Nobody should be surprised that jury trial has undergone great
changes over the last two centuries. It desperately needed reform.
The level of safeguard against mistaken conviction was in several
respects below what civilized peoples now require. What we will not
understand until there has been research directed to the question
is why the pressure for greater safeguard led in the Anglo-American
procedure to the law of evidence and the lawyerization of the trial,
reforms that ultimately destroyed the system in the sense that they
made jury trial so complicated and time-consuming that they ren-
dered it unworkable as the routine dispositive procedure. 2' Similar
pressures for safeguard were being felt on the Continent in the same
period, but they led to reforms in nonadversarial procedure that
preserved the institution of trial.22
the Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation, 73 YALE L.J. 1000, 1055-57 (1964).
" The latter portion of this paragraph is derived from Langbein, Controlling Prosecu-
torial Discretion in Germany, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 439, 445-46 (1974).
21 In isolating the transformation of jury trial as the root cause of plea bargaining, we do
not mean to imply that this procedural development is the sole cause of a practice so complex.
When the history of plea bargaining is ultimately written, there will certainly be other chap-
ters. In particular, it will be necessary to investigate the influence of the rise of professional
policing and prosecution and the accompanying changes in the levels of crime reporting and
detection; changes in the social composition of victim and offender groups; changes in the
rates and types of crime; and the intellectual influence of the marketplace model in an age
when laissez faire was not an epithet. However, these other phenomena were largely experi-
enced in Continental countries that did not turn to plea bargaining. Anyone looking beyond
the uniquely Anglo-American procedural development that we have emphasized needs to
explain why plea bargaining has characterized lands with such disparate social composition
as the United States and England, but not Germany, France, or the other major European
states.
In the middle of the 19th century, when German criminal procedure was being given its
modem shape, German scholars routinely studied English procedure as a reform model. They
found much to admire and to borrow (including the principle of lay participation in adjudica-
tion and the requirement that trials be conducted orally and in public), but they were
unanimous in rejecting the guilty plea. It was wrong for a court to sentence on "mere confes-
sion" without satisfying itself of the guilt of the accused. See, eg., von Arnold, Gestandniss
statt des Verdicts, 7 GERIcHTSSAAL pt. 1, 265, 275 (1855); Walther, Ueber die processualische
Wirkung des Gestandnisses im Schwurgerichtsverfahren, 1851 ARCHv DES CRIMINAMLRECrs
(Neue Folge) 225; Das Schwurgericht: Gestiindniss und Verdikt und Kollision zwischen
beiden, 18 GOLTDAMMEHS ARCHiy 530 (1870).
22 This paragraph (with note 21) is derived from Langbein, supra note 12.
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Il. THE PARALLELS
Let me now turn to my main theme-the parallels in function
and doctrine between the medieval European system of judicial
torture and our plea bargaining system. The starting point, which
will be obvious from what I have thus far said, is that each of these
substitute procedural systems arose in response to the breakdown
of the formal system of trial that it subverted. Both the medieval
European law of proof and the modem Anglo-American law of jury
trial set out to safeguard the accused by circumscribing the discre-
tion of the trier in criminal adjudication. The medieval Europeans
were trying to eliminate the discretion of the professional judge by
requiring him to adhere to objective criteria of proof. The Anglo-
American trial system has been caught up over the last two centu-
ries in an effort to protect the accused against the dangers of the jury
system, in which laymen ignorant of the law return a one- or two-
word verdict that they do not explain or justify. Each system found
itself unable to recant directly on the unrealistic level of safeguard
to which it had committed itself, and each then concentrated on
inducing the accused to tender a confession that would waive his
right to the safeguards.
The European law of torture preserved the medieval law of
proof undisturbed for those easy cases in which there were two eye-
witnesses or voluntary confession. But in the more difficult cases
(where, I might add, safeguard was more important), the law of
torture worked an absolutely fundamental change within the system
of proof: it largely eliminated the adjudicative function. Once prob-
able cause had been determined, the accused was made to concede
his guilt rather than his accusers to prove it.
In twentieth-century America we have duplicated the central
experience of medieval European criminal procedure: we have
moved from an adjudicatory to a concessionary system. We coerce
the accused against whom we find probable cause to confess his
guilt. To be sure, our means are much politer; we use no rack, no
thumbscrew, no Spanish boot to mash his legs. But like the Europe-
ans of distant centuries who did employ those machines, we make
it terribly costly for an accused to claim his right to the constitu-
tional safeguard of trial. We threaten him with a materially in-
creased sanction if he avails himself of his right and is thereafter
convicted. This sentencing differential is what makes plea bargain-
ing coercive. There is, of course, a difference 23 between having your
2 This difference is related to differences in the sanctions that characterize the medieval
and the modem worlds. The law of torture served legal systems whose only sanctions for
[46:3
19781 Torture and Plea Bargaining 13
limbs crushed if you refuse to confess, or suffering some extra years
of imprisonment if you refuse to confess, but the difference is of
degree, not kind. Plea bargaining, like torture, is coercive. 24 Like the
serious crime were severe physical maiming and death. The torture victim was coerced into
a confession that condemned him to the most severe of punishments, whereas the plea
bargain rewards the accused with a lesser sanction, typically some form of imprisonment, in
exchange for his confession. Obviously, the greater the severity of the sanction that the
accused's confession will bring down upon himself, the greater the coercion that must be
brought to bear upon him to wring out the confession. Plea bargaining is as coercive as it has
to be for the modem system of sanctions.
U Defenders of plea bargaining sometimes try to minimize the force of this point with a
reductio-ad-absurdum argument: granted that plea bargaining is coercive, so is virtually
every exercise of criminal jurisdiction, since few criminal defendants are genuine volunteers.
I think that the answer to this argument is straightforward. The accused is made a criminal
defendant against his wishes, but not contrary to his rights. The Constitution does not grant
citizens any immunity from criminal prosecution, but it does grant them the safeguard of
trial. Coercion authorized by law is different from coercion meant to overcome the guarantees
of law. Coercing people to stand trial is different from coercing them to waive trial and to
bring upon themselves sanctions that should only be imposed after impartial adjudication.
Sometimes, as I have mentioned in the text, a rather opposite argument is made in behalf
of plea bargaining-not that everything is coercive, but that a mere sentencing differential
is not serious enough to be reckoned as coercion. One can test this point simply by imagining
a differential so great (e.g., death versus a fifty-cent fine) that any reasonable defendant
would waive even the strongest defenses. Like torture, the sentencing differential in plea
bargaining elicits confessions of guilt that would not be freely tendered. It is, therefore,
coercive in the same sense as torture, although not in the same degree.
The question whether significant numbers of innocent people do plead guilty is not,
of course, susceptible to empirical testing. It is known that many of those who plead guilty
claim that they are innocent. See A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JusTicE 89-92 (1970). See also text
at note 29 infra (discussing North Carolina v. Alford). Alschuler thinks that "the greatest
pressures to plead are brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent." Alschuler, The
Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. Rav. 50, 60 (1968). See id. at 59-62 for
evidence that the threatened "sentence differential between guilty-plea and trial defendants
increases in direct proportion to the likelihood of acquittal." Id. at 60. Alschuler reports one
case that resembles the hypothetical choice between death penalty and fifty-cent fine:
San Francisco defense attorney Benjamin M. Davis recently represented a man
charged with kidnapping and forcible rape. The defendant was innocent, Davis says, and
after investigating the case Davis was confident of an acquittal. The prosecutor, who
seems to have shared the defense attorney's opinion on this point, offered to permit a
guilty plea to simple battery. Conviction on this charge would not have led to a greater
sentence than thirty days' imprisonment, and there was every likelihood that the de-
fendant would be granted probation. When Davis informed his client of this offer, he
emphasized that conviction at trial seemed highly improbable. The defendant's reply
was simple: "I can't take the chance."
Id. at 61.
I do not think that great numbers of American defendants plead guilty to offenses
committed by strangers. (The law of torture was also not supposed to apply in circumstances
where the accused could explain away the evidence that might otherwise have given cause to
examine him under torture. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 8, at 183.) I do believe that plea
bargaining is used to coerce the waiver of tenable defenses, as in Attorney Davis's example,
supra, or when the offense has a complicated conceptual basis, as in tax and other white collar
crimes.
The objection is sometimes voiced that if an accused is innocent, it stands to reason that
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medieval Europeans, the Americans are now operating a procedural
system that engages in condemnation without adjudication.2 5 The
maxim of the medieval Glossators, no longer applicable to Euro-
pean"6 law, now aptly describes American law: confessio est regina
probationum, confession is the queen of proof.
I have said that European law attempted to devise safeguards
for the use of torture that proved illusory; these measures bear an
eerie resemblance to the supposed safeguards of the American law
of plea bargaining. Foremost among the illusory safeguards of both
systems is the doctrinal preoccupation with characterizing the in-
duced waivers as voluntary. The Europeans made the torture victim
repeat his confession "voluntarily," but under the threat of being
tortured anew if he recanted. The American counterpart is Rule
11(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which forbids the
court from accepting a guilty plea without first "addressing the
defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is
voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart
from a plea agreement. "27 Of course, the plea agreement is the
source of the coercion and already embodies the involuntariness.
The architects of the European law of torture sought to enhance
the reliability of a torture-induced confession with other safeguards
designed to substantiate its factual basis. We have said that they
required a probable cause determination for investigation under
torture and that they directed the court to take steps to verify the
accuracy of the confession by investigating some of its detail. We
have explained why these measures were inadequate to protect
many innocent suspects from torture, confession, and condemna-
tion. Probable cause is not the same as guilt, and verification, even
he will press his defense at trial; if an innocent accused does plead guilty, he must necessarily
be calculating that there is a significant probability that the trier will fail to recognize his
innocence despite the great safeguards of trial designed to prevent such error. If trials were
perfectly accurate, plea bargaining would be perfectly accurate, since no innocent person
would have an incentive to accuse himself. Ironically, therefore, anyone who would denigrate
plea bargaining because it infringes the right to trial must also assume that the trial itself is
to some extent recognized to be mistake-prone. The response, of course, is that paradox is
not contradiction. So long as human judgment is fallible, no workable trial procedure can do
more than minimize error. The social cost of a rule of absolute certainty-massive release of
the culpable-would be intolerable. This was the lesson of the medieval European law, and
it explains why the standard of our law is not "beyond doubt" but "beyond reasonable
doubt."
' "A plea of guilty ... is itself a conviction .... More is not required; the court has
nothing to do but give judgment and sentence." Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,
223 (1927).
' See Casper & Zeisel, Lay Judges in the German Criminal Courts, 1 J. LEGAL STUD.
135, 146-47 (1972).
FED. R. CRM. P. 11(d) (emphasis added).
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if undertaken in good faith, could easily fail as a safeguard, either
because the matters confessed were not susceptible of physical or
testimonial corroboration, or because the accused might know
enough about the crime to lend verisimilitude to his confession even
though he was not in fact the culprit.
The American law of plea bargaining has pursued a similar
chimera: the requirement of "adequate factual basis for the plea."
Federal Rule 11(f) provides that "the court should not enter judg-
ment upon [a guilty] plea without making such inquiry as shall
satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. 2 8 As with the
tortured confession, so with the negotiated plea: any case that has
resisted dismissal for want of probable cause at the preliminary
hearing will rest upon enough inculpating evidence to cast suspicion
upon the accused. The function of trial, which plea bargaining elim-
inates, is to require the court to adjudicate whether the facts proven
support an inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Consider,
however, the case of North Carolina v. Alford, 2 decided in this
decade, in which the U.S. Supreme Court found it permissible to
condemn without trial a defendant who had told the sentencing
court: "I pleaded guilty on second degree murder because they said
there is too much evidence, but I ain't shot no man . . . .I just
pleaded guilty because they said if I didn't they would gas me for it
... I'm not guilty but I plead guilty. '3 I invite you to compare
Alford's statement with the explanation of one Johannes Julius,
seventeenth-century burgomaster of Bamberg, who wrote from his
dungeon cell where he was awaiting execution, in order to tell his
daughter why he had confessed to witchcraft "for which I must die.
It is all falsehood and invention, so help me God. . . .They never
cease to torture until one says something."3
The tortured confession is, of course, markedly less reliable
than the negotiated plea, because the degree of coercion is greater.
An accused is more likely to bear false witness against himself in
order to escape further hours on the rack than to avoid risking a
longer prison term. But the resulting moral quandary is the same.32
21 Id. 11(f).
- 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
Id. at 28 n.2.
' Quoted in H.R. TREVOR-RoPER, THE EuRoPEAN WrrcH-CRAzE OF THE 16TH AND 17TH
CErruRaEs 84 (1969) (Pelican ed.).
3' Some of those who have favored me with prepublication critiques of this paper have
resisted this point-largely, I think, because they do not give adequate weight to the serious-
ness with which the law of torture undertook to separate the guilty from the innocent. My
critics suggest that plea bargaining is in theory meant to have a differential impact upon the
guilty and the innocent, whereas torture was not. They contend that the plea bargaining
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Judge Levin of Michigan was speaking of the negotiated guilty plea,
but he could as well have been describing the tortured confession
when he said, "there is no way of knowing whether a particular
guilty plea was given because the accused believed he was guilty,
or because of the promised concession."' Beccaria might as well
have been speaking of the coercion of plea bargaining when he said
of the violence of torture that it "confounds and obliterates those
minute differences between things which enable us at times to know
truth from falsehood. ' 34 The doctrine of adequate factual basis for
the plea is no better substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt
than was the analogous doctrine in the law of torture.
The factual unreliability of the negotiated plea has further con-
sequences, quite apart from the increased danger of condemning an
innocent man. In the plea bargaining that takes the form of charge
bargaining (as opposed to sentence bargaining), the culprit is con-
victed not for what he did, but for something less opprobrious.
When people who have murdered are said to be convicted of wound-
ing, or when those caught stealing are nominally convicted of at-
tempt or possession, cynicism about the processes of criminal justice
is inevitably reinforced.35 This wilful mislabelling plays havoc with
system means to tell the accused, "Don't put us to the trouble of a trial unless you are really
innocent," whereas the law of torture gave the same message to both the innocent and the
guilty, "Confess or the pain will continue."
I think that both branches of the argument are mistaken. I have already pointed out,
supra note 24, that plea bargaining can and does induce innocent defendants to convict
themselves. As for the law of torture, I should reiterate that the safeguards discussed above,
see text at notes 6-9 supra, were designed for the sole purpose of separating the innocent from
the guilty, and the law of torture made express provision for releasing those who did not
confess under torture. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 1, at 16, 151 n.55. I am very willing to
concede that the safeguards of the law of torture were even less effective than those of plea
bargaining, but as I have said in the text, the difference is one of degree and not kind.
3 People v. Byrd, 12 Mich. App. 186, 206-07, 162 N.W.2d 777, 787 (1968) (Levin, J.,
concurring) (italics deleted).
Beccaria, Of Crimes and Punishment (1st ed. 1764) (J. Grigson trans.), reprinted in
preface to A. MANzom, THE COLUMN OF INFAMY 33 (1964).
' See, e.g., Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a Public
Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROB. 155, 158-59 (1964) (child molestation cases resulting in no
serious harm to the victim regularly reduced to the charge of loitering around a schoolyard,
even if the offense was committed nowhere near a schoolyard). (I owe this reference to
Profesor Richard Lempert.)
The sentences prescribed by statute in the United States are markedly more severe than
for comparable offenses in European states. In the words of Judge Frankel, ours is "a nation
where prison sentences of extravagant length are more common than they are almost any-
where else." United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). I know of no
study of the point, but I would be surprised if Hans Zeisel were far wrong in his suggestion
that each month of imprisonment in Continental sentences corresponds to a year in the
United States. Zeisel, Die Rolle der Geschworenen in den USA, 21 OSTERREICHISCHE
JURISTENZEITUNG 121, 123 (1966). The severity of our prescribed sentences contributes to the
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our crime statistics, which explains in part why Americans-
uniquely among Western peoples-attach so much importance
to arrest records rather than to records of conviction. I think that
the unreliability of the plea, the mislabelling of the offense, and
the underlying want of adjudication all combine to weaken the
moral force of the criminal law, and to increase the public's unease
about the administration of criminal justice. The case of James Earl
Ray is perhaps the best example of public dissatisfaction over the
intrinsic failure of the plea bargaining system to establish the facts
about crime and guilt in the forum of a public trial." It is interesting
to remember that in Europe in the age of Beccaria and Voltaire, the
want of adjudication and the unreliability of the law of torture had
bred a strangely similar cynicism towards that criminal justice sys-
tem.
Our law of plea bargaining has not only recapitulated much of
the doctrinal folly of the law of torture, complete with the pathetic
plea bargaining system by expanding the potential differential between sentence following
trial and sentence pursuant to plea bargain.
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the Europeans were ameliorating their
sentences, we were not. It is tempting to wonder whether the requirements of the plea bar-
gaining system have been somewhat responsible.
Of course, plea bargaining is not responsible for all of the downcharging and resultant
mislabelling in which modem American prosecutors engage. If the prosecutor views the statu-
torily prescribed minimum sentence for an offense as too severe, he can downcharge without
exacting a concessionary quid pro quo from the accused.
3, Of course, not every trial resolves the question of guilt of innocence to public satisfac-
tion. The Sacco-Vanzetti and the Rosenberg cases continue to be relitigated in the forum of
popular opinion.'However, plea bargaining leaves the public with what I believe to be a more
pronounced sense of unease about the justness of results, by avoiding the open ventilation of
evidence that characterizes public trial. Just this concern appears to have motivated the
government in the plea-bargained bribery case of Vice-President Agnew to take such extraor-
dinary steps to assure the disclosure of the substance of the prosecution case. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1973, § 1, at 35-38.
The public's hostility to plea bargaining should suggest why some of my colleagues in
the law-and-economics fraternity are mistaken in their complacent assimilation of plea bar-
gaining to the model of the negotiated settlement of civil disputes. However great the opera-
tional similarity, there is a profound difference in purpose between civil and criminal sanc-
tions. Henry Hart was surely correct that "[t]he core of the difference" between a confined
mental patient and an imprisoned convict is "that the patient has not incurred the moral
condemnation of his community, whereas the convict has." Hart, The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 406 (1958). The moral force of the criminal sanction
depends for part of its efficacy on the sanction having been imposed after rational inquiry
into the facts, culminating in an adjudication of guilt. To assert the equivalency of waiver
and adjudication is to overlook the distinctive characteristic of the criminal law.
It is for the same reason that the sentence differentials required by plea bargaining are
so repugnant to any tenable theory of sentencing. Nothing in the theory of deterrence, refor-
mation, or retribution justifies the enormous differentials needed to sustain plea bargaining.
Those differentials exist without a moral basis. On their extent, see, e.g., H. ZEMSEL, supra
note 11; Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1082-87.
1978]
The University of Chicago Law Review
safeguards of voluntariness and factual basis that I have just dis-
cussed, but it has also repeated the main institutional blunder of
the law of torture. Plea bargaining concentrates effective control of
criminal procedure in the hands of a single officer. Our formal law
of trial envisages a division of responsibility. We expect the prosecu-
tor to make the charging decision, the judge and especially the jury
to adjudicate, and the judge to set the sentence. Plea bargaining
merges these accusatory, determinative, and sanctional phases of
the procedure in the hands of the prosecutor. Students of the history
of the law of torture are reminded that the great psychological fal-
lacy of the European inquisitorial procedure of that time was that
it concentrated in the investigating magistrate the powers of accusa-
tion, investigation, torture, and condemnation. The single inquisi-
tor who wielded those powers needed to have what one recent histo-
rian has called "superhuman capabilities [in order to] . . .keep
himself in his decisional function free from the predisposing influ-
ences of his own instigating and investigating activity. '3
The dominant version of American plea bargaining makes simi-
lar demands: it requires the prosecutor to usurp the determinative
and sentencing functions, hence to make himself judge in his own
cause. I cannot emphasize too strongly how dangerous this concen-
tration of prosecutorial power can be. The modem public prosecutor
commands the vast resources of the state for gathering and generat-
ing accusing evidence. We allowed him this power in large part
because the criminal trial interposed the safeguard of adjudication
against the danger that he might bring those resources to bear
against an innocent citizen-whether on account of honest error,
arbitrariness, or worse.3 8 But the plea bargaining system has largely
dissolved that safeguard.
While on the subject of institutional factors, I have one last
comparison to advance. The point has been made, most recently by
the Attorney-General of Alaska,39 that preparing and taking cases
to trial is much harder work than plea bargaining-for police, prose-
cutors, judges, and defense counsel. In short, convenience-or
31 1 E. SCHMIDT, LEHRKOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG UND ZUM GERICHTSVER-
FASSUNGSGESETZ 197 (2d ed. 1964).
" One need not necessarily accept Jimmy Hoffa's view that Robert Kennedy was con-
ducting a personal and political vendetta against him in order to appreciate the danger that
he might have been. The power to prosecute as we know it contains within itself the power
to persecute. Hoffa contended "that special investigators from the Justice Dept. and
hundreds of agents from the Federal Bureau of Investigation were used to satisfy 'a personal
hate' of Robert Kennedy." Bus. WEEK, Feb. 13, 1965, at 48.
u Gross, Plea Bargaining: The Alaska Experience, 13 LAW & Soc'Y Rav. (1979) (forth-
coming).
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worse, sloth-is a factor that sustains plea bargaining. We suppose
that this factor had a little to do with torture as well. As someone
in India remarked to Sir James Fitzjames Stephen in 1872 about the
proclivity of the native policemen for torturing suspects, "It is far
pleasanter to sit comfortably in the shade rubbing red pepper into
a poor devil's eyes than to go about in the sun hunting up evi-
dence."" If we were to generalize about this point, we might say
that concessionary criminal procedural systems like the plea bar-
gaining system and the system of judicial torture may develop their
own bureaucracies and constituencies. Here as elsewhere the old
adage may apply that if necessity is the mother of invention, lazi-
ness is the father.
IV. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF CONCESSIONARY CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Having developed these parallels between torture and plea bar-
gaining, I want to draw some conclusions about what I regard as the
lessons of the exercise. The most important is this: a legal system
will do almost anything, tolerate almost anything, before it will
admit the need for reform in its system of proof and trial. The law
of torture endured for half a millennium although its dangers and
defects had been understood virtually from the outset; and plea
bargaining lives on although its evils are quite familiar to us all.
What makes such shoddy subterfuges so tenacious is that they
shield their legal systems from having to face up to the fact of
breakdown in the formal law of-proof and trial.
Why is it so hard for a legal system to reform a decadent system
of proof? I think that there are two main reasons. One is in a sense
practical: nothing is quite so imbedded in a legal system as the
procedures for proof and trial, because most of what a legal system
does is to decide matters of proof-what we call fact-finding. (Was
the traffic light green or red, was this accused the man who fired
the shot or robbed the bank?) Blackstone emphasized this point in
speaking of civil litigation, and it is even more true of criminal
litigation. He said: "experience will abundantly shew, that above
a hundred of our lawsuits arise from disputed facts, for one where
the law is doubted of."4' Every institution of the legal system is
geared to the system of proof; forthright reconstruction would dis-
turb, at one level or another, virtually every vested interest.
The inertia, the resistance to change that is associated with
" 1 J.F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 442 n.1 (1883). Stephen's
forceful quotation has been cited for this point elsewhere; McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S.
332, 344 n.8 (1943); J. LANOBEIN, supra note 1, at 147 n.14; Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1103
n.137.
," 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *330 (1768).
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such deep-seated interests, is inevitably reinforced by the powerful
ideological component that underlies a system of proof and trial.
Adjudication, especially criminal adjudication, involves a profound
intrusion into the lives of affected citizens. Consequently, in any
society the adjudicative power must be rested on a theoretical basis
that makes it palatable to the populace. Because the theory of proof
purports to govern and explain the application of the adjudicative
power, it plays a central role in legitimating the entire legal system.
The medieval European law of proof assured people that.the legal
system would achieve certainty. The Anglo-American jury system
invoked the inscrutable wisdom of the folk to justify its results."
Each of these theories was ultimately untenable-the European
theory virtually from its inception, the Anglo-American theory after
a centuries-long transformation of jury procedure. Yet the ideologi-
cal importance of these theories prevented either legal system from
recanting upon them. For example, I have elsewhere pointed out
how in the nineteenth century the ideological attachment to the jury
retarded experimentation with juryless trial-that is, what we now
call bench trial-while the plea bargaining system of juryless
nontrial procedure was taking shape out of public sight.4 3 Like the
medieval European lawyers before us, we have been unable to admit
that our theory of proof has resulted in a level of procedural com-
plexity and safeguard that renders our trial procedure unworkable
in all but exceptional cases. We have responded to the breakdown
of our formal system of proof by taking steps to perpetuate the
ideology of the failed system, steps that closely resemble those taken
by the architects of the law of torture. Like the medieval Europeans,
we have preserved an unworkable trial procedure in form, we have
devised a substitute nontrial procedure to subvert the formal proce-
dure, and we have arranged to place defendants under fierce pres-
sure to "choose" the substitute.
That this script could have been played out in a pair of legal
cultures so remote from each other in time and place invites some
suggestions about the adaptive processes of criminal procedural sys-
tems. First, there are intrinsic limits to the level of complexity and
safeguard that even a civilized people can tolerate. If those limits
are exceeded and the repressive capacity of the criminal justice
system is thereby endangered, the system will respond by develop-
ing subterfuges that overcome the formal law. But subterfuges are
intrinsically overbroad, precisely because they are not framed in a
42 See T.F.T. PLUCKNETT, EDWARD I AND CRIMINAL LAW 74-75 (1960).
, Langbein, supra note 12.
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careful, explicit, and principled manner directed to achieving a pro-
per balance between repression and safeguard. The upshot is that
the criminal justice system is saddled with a lower level of safeguard
than it could and would have achieved if it had not pretended to
retain the unworkable formal system.
The medieval Europeans insisted on two eyewitnesses and
wound up with a law of torture that allowed condemnation with no
witnesses at all. American plea bargaining, in like fashion, sacrifices
just those values that the unworkable system of adversary jury trial
is meant to serve: lay participation in criminal adjudication, the
presumption of innocence, the prosecutorial burden of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, the right to confront and cross-examine accusers,
the privilege against self-incrimination. Especially in its handling
of the privilege against self-incrimination does American criminal
procedure reach the outer bounds of incoherence. In cases like
Griffin v. California" we have exaggerated the privilege to senseless
lengths in formal doctrine, while in the plea bargaining sys-
tem-which is our routine procedure for processing cases of serious
crime-we have eliminated practically every trace of the privilege.
Furthermore, the sacrifice of our fundamental values through
plea bargaining is needless. In its sad plea bargaining opinions of
the 1970s, the Supreme Court has effectively admitted that for rea-
sons of expediency American criminal justice cannot honor its
promise of routine adversary criminal trial,45 but the Court has sim-
ply assumed that the present nontrial plea bargaining procedure is
the inevitable alternative. There is, however, a middle path between
the impossible system of routine adversary jury trial and the dis-
graceful nontrial system of plea bargaining. That path is a stream-
lined nonadversarial trial procedure.
The contemporary nonadversarial criminal justice systems of
countries like West Germany have long demonstrated that ad-
vanced industrial societies can institute efficient criminal proce-
dures that nevertheless provide for lay participation and for full
adjudication in every case of serious crime. I have described the
German system in detail elsewhere," and I have made no secret of
my admiration for the brilliant balance that it strikes between safe-
guard and procedural effectiveness. Not the least of its achieve-
" 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
U In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), Chief Justice Burger explained that
plea bargaining "is to be encouraged" because "[i]f every criminal charge were subjected to
a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many
times the number of judges and court facilities." Id. at 260.
4" See generally J. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY (1977).
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ments is that in cases of serious crime it functions with no plea
bargaining whatsoever. 7 Confessions are still tendered in many
cases (41 percent in one sample 8), but they are not and cannot be
bargained for; nor does a confession excuse the trial court from
hearing sufficient evidence for conviction on what amounts to a
beyond-reasonable-doubt standard of proof. 9 In a trial procedure
shorn of all the excesses of adversary procedure and the law of
evidence, the time difference between trial without confession and
trial with confession is not all that great." Because an accused will
be put to trial whether he confesses or not, he cannot inflict signifi-
cant costs upon the prosecution by contesting an overwhelming
case. Confessions are tendered at trial not because they are re-
warded, but because there is no advantage to be wrung from the
procedural system by withholding them.
I hope that over the coming decades we who still live under
criminal justice systems that engage in condemnation without adju-
dication will face up to the failure of adversary criminal procedure.
I believe that we will find in modern Continental criminal procedure
an irresistible model for reform. That, however, is a theme about
which I can say no more if I am to remain within the proper sphere
of the Crosskey Lecture in Legal History.
Thus, I am brought to conclude with a paradox. Today in lands
where the law of torture once governed, peoples who live in content-
ment with their criminal justice systems look out across the sea in
disbelief 51 to the spectacle of plea bargaining in America, while
American tourists come by the thousands each year to gawk in
disbelief at the decaying torture chambers of medieval castles.
11 For recent discussion see Langbein & Weinreb, Continental Criminal Procedure:
"Myth" and Reality, 87 YALE L.J. 1549, 1561-65 (1978). For the observation that modem
Continental nonadversarial procedure confers more safeguards upon the accused than does
American plea bargaining, see Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models
of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 552 (1973).
Casper & Zeisel, supra note 26, at 146-47, 150-51.
" See J. LANOBEIN, supra note 46, at 66-67, 73-74.
See id. at 77; Casper & Zeisel, supra note 26, at 150.
51 See Langbein, supra note 20, at 457 n.44 (1974):
Plea bargaining is all but incomprehensible to the Germans, whose ordinary dispositive
procedure is workable without such evasions. In the German press the judicial procedure
surrounding the resignation of Vice President Agnew was viewed with the sort of wonder
normally inspired by reports of the customs of primtitive tribes. "The resignation oc-
curred as part of a 'cow-trade,' as it can only in the United States be imagined."
Badische Zeitung, Oct. 12, 1973, at 3, col. 2.
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